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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge as 
an interior kernel operator K of a topological space (X, OX) comes along with a partially 
ordered family of belief modalities B that fit K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all 
axioms of Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief with the exception of the contentious 
axiom of negative introspection (NI). The new belief modalities B introduced in this paper are 
defined with the help of the (dense) nuclei of the Heyting algebra OX of open subsets on the 
topological space (X, OX). In this way, the natural context for the belief operators B related to 
topological knowledge operator K is shown to be the Heyting algebra NUC(OX) of the nuclei 
of the Heyting algebra OX.1 More precisely, the dense nuclei of NUC(OX) can be used to 
define a variety of bimodal logics of knowledge operators K and belief operators B. The 
operators K and B are compatible with each other in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all 
axioms of Stalnaker’s KB system with the exception of the axiom (NI).2 Therefore, for (X, 
OX), one obtains a bounded, partially ordered family of belief operators B defined by the 
elements of NUC(OX). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION. Understanding the relation between knowledge and belief is an issue of 
central importance in formal epistemology. Especially after the birth of knowledge-first 
 
1 Many arguments concerning nuclei rely on the specific lattice-theoretical structures of Heyting algebras. 
Collections of useful formulas of from the Heyting calculus can be found in Borceux (1994, chapter 1.2), 
Johnstone (1982, I, 1.10ff), and Picado and Pultr (2012, Appendix I, 7)). They are freely used in this paper. 
2 Instead of (NI), the belief operators B satisfy a weaker axiom of “doxastically possible negative introspection” 
(DPNI). 
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epistemology, the question of what exactly distinguishes an item of knowledge and an item of 
belief and how one can be determined in terms of the other has become even more pertinent. 
In the recent literature on the topological semantics of Stalnaker’s KB system, only one belief 
operator of a whole family of plausible operators has been considered (cf. Baltag et al. 2013, 
2017, 2019)), namely, the operator intclint (cl being the closure operator of int). This operator 
is defined by a very special nucleus, namely, the largest dense nucleus of (X, OX). Moreover, 
arguably, this operator is not the only and not the most plausible member of the family of belief 
operators B that are compatible with K.3 Thus, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the relationship between knowledge and belief, it seems to be expedient to discuss the whole 
group of options instead of only one rather special option. 
In Stalnaker’s KB system, belief modality B is definable by the knowledge operator. In this 
paper, a more complex and more flexible relation between knowledge K and belief B is 
proposed. In a nutshell, this relation may be described as follows. The topological structure (X, 
OX) in its totality defines a family of belief operators B that fit the knowledge operator defined 
by (X, OX). The family of belief operators has the structure of a bounded partial order (and 
under favorable special circumstances, even the structure of a distributive lattice) that is 
constructed from the Heyting algebra OX. Stalnaker’s belief operator turns out to be just the 
top element of this partial order of belief operators. 
Given K, the lattice of admissible belief operators can be used to set up a kind of logic of belief 
operators: different belief operators can be compared according to their strengths and how far 
they deviate from the knowledge operator K. In this vein, it can be shown that Stalnaker’s 
operator B is only one special case among many other consistent belief operators. 
 
3 For general topological spaces (X, OX) with a knowledge operator K (defined by the topological interior kernel 
operator), a well-behaved belief operator is defined by intclint. This belief operator is the only one that is dealt 
with in Stalnaker (2006) and the various papers of Baltag et al. For a very special class of topological spaces, 
namely, extremally disconnected spaces, the definition of this operator can be simplified to clint. As will become 
clear in the following sections, for general spaces, it is more natural to consider more general belief operators that 
have the form Bint, where B is a nucleus, i.e., an element of the frame NUC(OX) of nuclei of OX. 
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The unimodal systems of belief based on B that can be derived from full KB systems can be 
proven to be KD4 in general. 
The relation between topology and modal logic is often described as a relation between classes 
of modal logical systems (such as S4, S4.1, S4.2, S4.Z, etc.) and classes of topological spaces 
that can serve as models for these modal systems. The first examples of this correspondence 
can be found in McKinsey and Tarski’s trail-blazing paper of 1944, in which they proved such 
a correspondence between S4 and the class TOP of all topological spaces. More recent results 
in this area deal with the class WSC of weakly scattered spaces corresponding to S4.1, the class 
ED of extremally disconnected spaces corresponding to S4.2, the class of hereditarily 
extremally disconnected spaces (HED spaces) corresponding to S4.3, etc. Results of this kind 
have been obtained by Bezhanishvili and others (cf. (Bezhanishvili et al. (2004), (2015) Aiello 
et al. (2007)). 
Usually, the relation between belief and knowledge is conceptualized in a rather direct way: 
either knowledge is defined as a special kind of belief (e.g., knowledge is a true and justified 
belief, as in the received JTB account of knowledge), or knowledge—having conceptual 
priority—defines belief in a unique way. This is carried out in Stalnaker’s approach, which 
defines belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge (cf. Stalnaker (2006), Baltag et al. 
(2017)). In a sense, this paper follows the knowledge-first approach but with a special twist. It 
is shown that for a given knowledge operator K, there exists a pool of different admissible 
belief operators B such that the pairs (K, B) all define a well-behaved system of epistemic logic 
satisfying the axioms of Stalnaker’s KB system. Therefore, different cognitive agents who 
subscribe to the same knowledge operator K may use different agent-specific belief operators. 
The present paper pursues the following strategy. We propose using the topological structure 
of the space (X, OX) (encapsulated in the Heyting algebra OX and unfolded by the Heyting 
algebra NUC(OX)) as a means to construct a family of appropriate belief operators. Every 
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knowledge operator K (= int) comes with a class of appropriate belief operators B in the sense 
that the pairs (K, B) satisfy the axioms of Stalnaker’s KB system, with the exception of the 
axiom of “negative introspection” (NI). 
The organization of this paper is as follows: to set the stage, in the next section, we recall the 
basics of a topological interpretation of Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief. In 
section 3, we introduce the concept of a (topological) nucleus that is central to the whole paper. 
In section 4, the relation between nuclei and belief modalities is studied in detail. In section 5, 
the structure underlying belief operators is elaborated, and several examples of nuclei and the 
most important facts about them are briefly mentioned. We conclude with some general 
remarks on the further elaboration of this nucleus-based approach in section 6. 
 
 
2. A TOPOLOGICAL SEMANTICS FOR STALNAKER’S KB LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND BELIEF. First, for the sake of definiteness, let us recall the axioms and the inference 
rules of Stalnaker’s system (cf. Stalnaker (2006), Baltag et al. (2017, 2019): 
 
(2.1) Definition (Stalnaker’s axioms and inference rules for knowledge and belief) 
(K)   K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ)   (Knowledge is additive). 
(T)   Kϕ → ϕ      (Knowledge implies truth). 
(KK)   Kϕ → KKϕ      (Positive introspection for K) . 
(CB)   Bϕ →  ¬ B ¬ ϕ     (Consistency of belief). 
(PI)   Bϕ → KBϕ      (Positive introspection of B). 
(NI)  ¬ Bϕ → K¬ Bϕ    (Negative introspection of B). 
(KB)   Kϕ → Bϕ     (Knowledge implies belief). 
(FB)   Bϕ → BKϕ     (Full belief). 
Inference Rules: 
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(MP)   From ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ.   (Modus Ponens). 
(NEC)  From ϕ, infer Kϕ.    (Necessitation).¨ 
 
For the topological approach to knowledge and belief, the axiom (NI) plays a special role. It is 
easily shown that this holds for topological models of a very special kind, namely, topological 
spaces that are extremally disconnected spaces. As will be argued in the following sections, 
this assertion should be replaced by the weaker axiom of “doxastically possible negative 
introspection”. 
 
(2.2) Definition. Let B be a belief operator. The operator of doxastic possibility <B> is defined 
as <B> ϕ:= ¬ B¬ ϕ. B satisfies the axiom of “doxastically possible negative introspection” iff 
 
(DPNI) ¬ Bϕ → <B >¬ Bϕ     (Possible negative introspection of B). ¨ 
 
(DPNI) may be considered a weakened version of (PN) in which K is replaced by <<K<K>>. 
As will be shown, the pairs (K, B) of knowledge operators K and belief operators B that will 
be defined in the following sections satisfy all of Stalnaker’s rules and axioms except (NI). 
Instead of (NI), the axiom (DPNI) is satisfied. 
Now let us recall the basics of the interior semantics for modal epistemic logic as presented by 
Baltag, Bezhanishvili, Özgün, and Smets in various recent publications (cf. Baltag et al. (2013, 
2015, 2016, 2019). This semantics will be used throughout the rest of this paper. 
We start with a standard unimodal epistemic language LK with a countable set of propositional 
letters Prop, Boolean operators ¬ and Ù, and a modal operator K to be interpreted as a 
knowledge operator. The formulas of LK are defined as usual by the grammar 
j::= p½¬p½fÙy½Kj      ,          j Î Prop. 
The abbreviations for the Boolean connectives Ú, ¾>, and <¾> are standard. Analogous to 
LK, a bimodal epistemological language LKB for operators K and B is defined. For a more 
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detailed presentation of topological semantics, the reader may consult the recent papers of 
Baltag et al. 
 
(2.3) Definition. Let X be a (nonempty) set with a power set PX. A topological space is an 
ordered pair (X, OX) with OX Í PX that satisfies the following conditions: 
 
(i)       Ø, X Î OX. 
(ii)     OX is closed under finite set-theoretical intersections and arbitrary unions. 
 
The elements of OX are called open sets of X or simply opens. Set-theoretical complements of 
open sets are called closed sets.¨ 
 
Topological operators, such as the interior operator int, the closure operator cl and the boundary 
operator bd, are defined as usual (for details, see Steen and Seebach Jr. (1982), Willard (2004) 
or any other textbook on set-theoretical topology). 
 
(2.4) Definition. Given a topological space (X, OX), we define a topo(logical) model for LK as 
M = (X, OX, v), where Prop¾v¾> PX is a valuation function in the usual sense.¨ 
 
Given a topological model (X, OX, v), the interior semantics for the language LK is defined as 
usual. In particular, if a formula j of L is interpreted by v(j) = A Î PX, then formula Kf of 
LK is interpreted as v(Kf):= intA. 
Usually, it is not necessary to explicitly mention the interpretation v. Hence, we use a set-
theoretical denotation and write A, KA, or intA instead of v(j), Kv(j), for A = v(j), etc. 
Given a topological model M, the knowledge operator K is always interpreted as the 
topological interior kernel operator int of (X, OX). Several belief operators B will be defined 




3. NUCLEI OF THE HEYTING ALGEBRA OX. In this section, we introduce the basic 
concept of a nucleus for dealing with the wealth of belief operators related to a knowledge 
operator K defined by a topological structure (X, OX). The literature on nuclei in (point-free) 
topology has reached a high level of technical sophistication. It is not the aim of this paper to 
give a full-fledged introduction into the theory of nuclei. Instead, we intend to provide the basic 
definitions and facts so that the reader can understand that this theory has interesting 
applications regarding the modal theory of belief and knowledge. For a fuller account, the 
reader may consult Johnstone (1982), Borceux (1994), or Pultr and Picado (2012). 
 
(3.1) Definition. Let (X, OX) be a topological space, and let A Î OX. A map OX¾¾j¾> OX 
is called a nucleus of (X, OX) if it satisfies the following properties: 
(i)  A ≤ j(A). 
(ii)   j(j(A)) ≤ j(A). 
(iii)  j(A Ù B) = j(A) Ù j(B). 
(iv) A nucleus j is dense iff j(Ø) = Ø. 
The set of nuclei of (X, OX) is denoted by NUC(OX).¨ 
 
(3.2) Definition. The set of nuclei NUC(OX) is partially ordered by j ≤ j’:= j(A) Í j’(A) for all 
A Î OX.¨ 
 
Clearly, the bottom element of this partial order is the identity operator id, and the top element 
is the (trivial) nucleus that maps every D Î OX onto X Î OX. 
In the last twenty or thirty years, the investigation of NUC(OX) has turned out to be a fruitful 
pathway for studying topological problems of various kinds, particularly problems related to 
point-free topology (cf. Johnstone (1982), Borceux (1994), Picado and Pultr (2012)). In this 
 8 
paper, we conduct some very modest steps to use the concept of nuclei for shedding some new 
light on the problems of modal systems that deal with the epistemological concepts of 
knowledge and belief. More precisely, we will deal with problems related to the topological 
models of Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief. Before answering the specific 
questions regarding this issue, it seems expedient to provide some examples of nuclei and to 
elucidate the structure of NUC(OX). First, we give some simple examples of nuclei. 
 
(3.3) Examples. Let (X, OX) be a topological space, where A, B, D Î OX. Denote the join and 
Heyting implication of OX by È and Þ, respectively. 
(i)  The identity map OX¾¾id¾¾>OX is a nucleus. 
(ii) The map kA defined by kA(D):= A È D is a nucleus. This nucleus is called the closed 
nucleus defined by A. 
(iii)  The map jA defined by jA(D) = (A Þ D) is a nucleus. This nucleus is called the open 
nucleus defined by A. 
(iv)  Let int and cl denote the interior kernel operator and the closure operator of (X, OX), 
respectively. The operator OX——j**——>OX defined by j**(D):= intcl((D)) is a 
nucleus. It is called the regular nucleus and is denoted by j**. 
In this paper, dense nuclei play the most important role. Hence, it may be expedient to provide 
some explicit (counter)examples of this kind of nucleus: 
 
(3.4) Examples of dense and not dense nuclei. 
(i) The identity map OX¾¾id¾>OX is a dense nucleus. 
(ii) For A ≠ Ø, the closed nucleus kA is not dense since kA(Ø) = A È Ø = A. 
(iii) Recall that A Î OX is dense in the topological sense iff A*:= (A Þ Ø) = Ø. The open 
nuclei jA defined by jA(D):= A Þ D are dense nuclei iff A is dense, since jA(Ø) = (A Þ 
Ø) = A*. 
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(iv) The regular nucleus j** is a dense nucleus since j**(Ø) = intcl(Ø) = Ø. 
(v) The constant nucleus 1 that maps each element of OX onto X is a nucleus. Clearly, 1 is 
not dense since 1(Ø) = X. For all nuclei j, one has id ≤ j ≤ 1.¨ 
 
In recent decades, NUC(OX) has been thoroughly studied by many authors (see Johnstone 
(1982), Picado and Pultr (2012) and the works cited therein). For the purposes of the present 
paper, we need not go into the technical details of these investigations. Instead, we are content 
to show that nuclei may play a useful role in epistemic logic, more precisely, in the logic of 
knowledge and belief. Our starting point is the following definition: 
 
(3.5) Definition. Let (X, OX) be a topological model with an interior kernel operator int, and 
let j Î NUC(OX) be a nucleus OX¾¾j¾¾>OX. Denote the concatenation 
                                             PX¾int¾>OX¾¾j¾¾>OX¾i¾>PX 
by Bj (or often simply by B if there is no need to single out a specific j). Then, Bj is a well-
defined operator PX¾¾Bj¾¾>PX mapping A onto B(A). The operator Bj is called a 
(nuclear) belief operator (defined for K and related to j). If w Î X, then the assertion w Î Bj(A) 
is to be interpreted epistemically as the assertion “an epistemic agent t (relying on K and Bj) 
believes that w is an A-world, i.e., t believes that w Î A.”¨ 
 
The rest of this paper is dedicated to showing that (3.5) is a reasonable definition that defines 
a family of well-behaved belief operators Bj (j Î NUC(OX)) for knowledge operator K that 
enjoy all properties that one intuitively expects from “good” belief operators. Of course, there 
is no full unanimity of what “good properties for a belief modality” are, but the following 
properties are probably rather uncontroversial candidates: 
 
(3.6) Adequacy conditions for belief operators. A good, i.e., intuitively plausible, belief 
operator B should satisfy the following conditions: 
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(1) A cognitive agent t who relies on B may have a false belief. Formally, A may be a 
proposition A Í X, such that w Î BA but wÏ A, i.e., t believes that w is an A-world, but w is 
not actually an A-world. 
(2) A good concept of belief should be consistent, i.e., if t believes that w is an A-world, then 
t does not believe that w is not an A-world, i.e., w Î B(A) entails that wÏ B (¬A). 
(3) A good concept of belief should be compatible with the related concept of knowledge, i.e., 
if t knows that w is an A-world, then t believes A, i.e., K(A)¾¾>B(A).¨ 
 
(3.7) Proposition. Let (X, OX) be a topological space, K = int, id ≠ jÎ NUC(OX), and B = jint 
be a dense belief operator related to K. Then, B is a good belief operator. 
Proof. The only aspect that has not yet been proven is that B may possibly be false. By the 
definition of the pointwise partial order (3.2), the smallest nucleus of OX is the identity id. 
Thus, according to our assumption id < j, there must be an A Î OX such that A Ì j(A) and A 
≠ j(A). This is equivalent to B(A) Ç CA ≠ Ø. In other words, there is a world w Î B(A) Ç CA. 
This means that the epistemic agent who uses belief operator B believes w to be an A-world 
but in actuality, w is not an A-world. In other words, the agent’s belief is false.¨ 
 
More systematically, one may require that for good belief operators, the pair (K, B) should 
satisfy the rules and axioms of Stalnaker’s KB logic. In the next section, we will prove that this 
is indeed the case for nuclear belief operators. For the moment, we are content to prove that 
the belief fragment of the KB system defines a well-behaved logic of belief. 
 
(3.8) Proposition. Let (X, OX) be a topological space with an interior kernel operator int, where 
D, E Î OX. Then, a dense nuclear belief operator B: = jint, j Î NUC(OX) defines a KD4 logic 
of belief, i.e., the following axioms are satisfied: 
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(i)  (K)    B(D¾¾>E) ¾¾> (B(D) ¾¾>B(E)). 
(ii)  (D)  B(D) ¾¾>CB(CD). 
(iii)  (4)   B(D)¾¾>B(B(D)). 
 
Proof. (i) By definition, B is distributive with respect to the conjunction Ç. Therefore, one has 
B(D) Ç B(D¾¾>E) = B((D Ç (D ¾>E)) = B(D Ç E) Í B(D) 
Hence, we obtain B(D) Ç B(D ¾¾>E) Í B(D). By propositional logic, this is equivalent to 
                                         B(D ¾¾>E) Í B(D) ¾¾>B(E). 
(ii) One can calculate Ø = B(D Ç CD) = B(D) Ç B(CD) iff B(D) Í CB(CD). In other words, 
axiom (D) holds for belief operator B. 
(iii) To prove axiom 4, one observes that belief operator B is idempotent since BB = jintjint = 
jjint = jint. Since int satisfies the rule of necessitation “If ½¾ E then ½¾ intE”, jint satisfies 
the rule of necessitation a fortiori. Hence, B defines a KD4 logic.¨ 
 
(3.9) Corollary. A dense nuclear belief operator B = jint, j Î NUC(OX), satisfies the axiom of 
doxastically possible negative introspection: 
 
(DPNI)                                     ¬ Bϕ → <B >¬ Bϕ 
 
Informally, a cognitive agent who does not believe ϕ can possibly believe that he/she does not 
believe ϕ. In other words, it is not beyond his/her imagination to believe that he/she does not 
believe ϕ.¨ 
 
4. NUCLEAR BELIEF OPERATORS AND THE LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 
After these preparations, we can state the main theorem of this paper: 
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(4.1) Theorem. Let (X, OX) be a topological space, and let j Î NUC(OX) be a dense nucleus. 
Then, the belief operator B := jint satisfies all axioms of the Stalnaker KB system with the 
exception of the axiom of strong negative introspection (NI). 
 
Proof. Axioms (K), (T), and (KK) involve only the operator int and are known to hold for 
topological models of knowledge. Hence, it is sufficient to consider axioms (i) (CB), (ii) (PI), 
(iii) (DPNI), (iv) (KB) and (v) (FB). 
(i): Consistency of belief (CB): Axiom (CB) is just axiom (D), which has already been proven 
in (3.7)(ii). 
(ii): Positive introspection of B (PI): The set B(D) is, by the definition of B, open since j is a 
nucleus. Hence, B(D) Í int(B(D)), i.e., (PI) is satisfied. 
(iii): Doxastically possible negative introspection (DPNI): This has already been proven in 
(3.9). 
(iv): Knowledge implies belief (KB): Clearly, int(D) Í jint(D) since j is a nucleus, i.e., id ≤ j. 
(v): Full belief (FB): This holds by the definition of B and the (KK) principle of K. 
Thus, for a dense nucleus jÎ NUC(OX), a belief operator B:= jint satisfies all axioms and rules 
of Stalnaker’s KB system (except (NI)).¨ 
 
To show that (4.1) may actually be interesting for the logic of knowledge and belief, one must 
show that topological models (X, OX) have a sufficient supply of dense nuclei (beyond j**). 
This is ensured by the following proposition: 
 
(4.2) Proposition. Let (X, OX) be a topological space and DOX Í OX be the set of open dense 
elements of OX, A Î DOX. The map DOX¾¾j¾¾>NUC(OX) defined by jA(D):= A Þ D 
is a monomorphism, i.e., jA = jA’ iff A = A’. 
 13 
Proof. Assume that jA = jA’. For D = A, one obtains jA(A) = (A Þ A) = 1 = (A’Þ A) = jA’(A). 
By Proposition 1.2.3 (1) of Borceux (1994), this yields A’ ≤ A. Analogously, for D = A’, one 
obtains A ≤ A’. Hence, A = A’.¨ 
 
Thus, for a given knowledge operator K, depending on the structure of (X, OX), there are many 
distinct belief operators B related to K such that (K, B) satisfies Stalnaker’s axioms. Theorem 
(4.3) may be conceived as a generalization and flexibilization of Stalnaker’s KB account: a 
topological knowledge operator based on a space (X, OX) knowledge operator K comes with 
a family of belief operators BA. For all dense elements A Î DOX, the pair (K, BA) satisfies all 
axioms of the KB system (except (NI)). 
Following Stalnaker, Baltag et al. (2019) emphasized that as an important feature of Stalnaker’s 
system (X, OX), the equivalence Bϕ ↔ <K> Kϕ is provable in KB. According to them, this 
proposition 
“constitutes one of the most important features of Stalnaker’s combined system KB. 
This equivalence allows us to have a combined logic of knowledge and belief in 
which the only modality is K and the belief modality B is defined in terms of the 
former. We therefore obtain “...a more economical formulation of the combined 
belief-knowledge logic...” (Stalnaker (2006, p. 179), Baltag et al. (2019, p.221)) 
 
“Economy” is certainly an important feature of logical systems, but one may ask whether such 
an “economy” for KB is actually desirable. Given a knowledge operator K, it may be more 
plausible to have an available family of belief operators B that are compatible with int in the 
sense that all its members (K, B) satisfy all Stalnaker axioms except the notorious axiom (NI), 
which is to be replaced by the slightly weaker axiom (DPNI). 
 
5. TOWARDS A LOGIC OF NUCLEAR BELIEF OPERATORS. Let (X, OX) be a 
topological space such that the interior operator int is interpreted as the knowledge operator K 
of an epistemic agent t. This may be spelled out more explicitly as follows. Assume that w Î 
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A Í X. Then, t knows that w Î A if and only if w Î int(A) since w Î int(A) iff there is a small 
open neighborhood U(w) Î OX such that U(w) Í int(A). The neighborhood U(w) may be 
interpreted as a piece of evidence that entitles t to assert that he/she knows that w is an A-
world. 
The set of belief operators B inherits a partial order from the partial order of the nuclei by 
which they are defined. The smallest belief operator is int = idOX int, and the greatest dense 
belief operator is the operator intclint = j**int defined by the regular nucleus j** (Isbell’s 
density theorem). Therefore, we obtain a spectrum of consistent belief operators ranging from 
pure knowledge represented by K up to weak belief represented by K<K>K = intclint. For all 
belief operators B in between, i.e., int ≤ B ≤ intclint, the pair (K, B) satisfies the Stalnaker 
axioms (except (NI)). 
Given a topological knowledge operator int, it has been shown that int is accompanied by a 
partially ordered family of belief operators B, such that the pairs (int, B) satisfy the axioms of 
Stalnaker’s KB logic except the axiom (NI). Instead of (NI), the pair (int, B) satisfies the 
weaker axiom (PNI) that may be characterized as the axiom of the doxastic possibility of 
negative introspection. 
For E, F Î DOX, E Ç F is dense as well of course, since (E Ç F)** = E** Ç F** =1 Ç 1 = 1. 
This result can be strengthened in various ways. For instance, if (X, OX) is a Baire space 
(REF, REF), not only the finite but even the countable intersection of dense open sets Ai is 
still open and dense. 
 
(5.1) Proposition. For all A ÎDOX, the open nucleus jA defined by jA (D) = A Þ D is smaller 
than j**, jA ≤ j**. 
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Proof. For all D Î OX, one must show that jA(D) ≤ D**. One calculates (A Ç D)** = A**Ç 
D** = X Ç D** = D**. From A Ç D = A Ç (A ÞD), we obtain that (A Ç D)** = A**Ç (A 
Þ D)** = (A Þ D)** = D**. Hence, (A Þ D) ≤ (A Þ D)** = D**.¨ 
 
Actually, a much stronger theorem can be proved: 
 
(5.2) Theorem. For all topological spaces, all dense nuclei j Î NUC(OX) are smaller than the 
regular nucleus j**, i.e., j ≤ j**. 
Proof. Use Isbell’s density theorem, Johnstone 1982.¨ 
 
Taking only the open and closed nuclei of a Heyting algebra OX into consideration is not more 
than simply scratching the surface of NUC(OX). Most elements of NUC(OX) are neither open 
nor closed. The rich structure of NUC(OX) may be relevant for epistemic logic, since it is 
easily shown that in general, not all dense nuclei are open, i.e., there are dense nuclear belief 
operators different from jA(D):= A Þ intD, A Î DOX. We are content to prove this assertion 
for the class of dense-in-itself and T1-spaces. For this purpose, recall the following definition 
(cf. Steen and Seebach Jr. (1978) and Willard (2004)): a topological space (X, OX) is dense-
in-itself iff it has no isolated point, i.e., int({x}) = Ø for all x Î X. The space is a T1-space iff 
all singletons {x}are closed, i.e., cl({x}) = {x}. Examples of such spaces abound; for instance, 
the real line (R, OR) endowed with the familiar Euclidean topology is dense-in-itself and T1.¨ 
 
(5.3) Proposition. Let (X, OX) be a dense-in-itself T1-space. Then, the nucleus j** is not open, 
i.e., there is no A Î OX such that j**(D) ≠ A Þ D for all D. 
 
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e., there is A Î DOX such that D** = A Þ D for all D Î OX. 
Consider Dx := X – {x} for xÎ X. Clearly, Dx is dense, i.e., Dx** = X. Hence, A Í Dx for all x 
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Î X according to Borceux (1.2.3 (1)). Thus, A Í Ç Dx = Ø. This is a contradiction since Ø is 
not dense. Hence, the regular nucleus j** is not open.¨ 
 
Distinct dense elements of A Î DOX define distinct dense nuclei jA (and therefore consistent 
belief operators) with id ≤ jA ≤ j**. Denoting the set of dense nuclei of OX by DNUC(OX), it 
has been shown that the map DOX¾¾¾j¾¾>DNUC(OX) defined by j(A)(D):= A Þ D, A 
Î DOX is a monomorphism but not an epimorphism. Moreover, exploiting some well-known 
facts of Heyting algebras, the following is easily proven.  
 
(5.4) Proposition. Let A, B, CÎ OX. Then, one obtains the following for the nuclei jA, jB, and 
jAÈB: 
(i)  jA È B(C) = jA(C) Ç jB(C).    
(ii)            jA (B Ç C) = jA(B) Ç jA(C). 
Proof. (i) Since the Heyting implication Þ is a contravariant functor in the first variable, we 
have (A È B) Þ C Í (A Þ C) Ç (B Þ C). Hence, we must only prove that 
                                           (A Þ C) Ç (B Þ C) Í (A È B) Þ C 
For this task, we rely on the fact that the Heyting implication Þ is adjoint to the intersection 
Ç (for a useful collection of formulas relevant to Heyting algebras, see Borceux (1994, 1.2)). 
Using some of these formulas, one calculates the following for all A, B, and C: 
                       (A Þ C) Ç (B Þ C) Ç (A È B) 
                    = ((A Þ C) Ç A Ç (B Þ C)) È ((A Þ C) Ç (B Þ C) Ç B)) 
                       Í (C Ç (B Þ C))) È (C Ç (A Þ C)) = C. 
By adjunction, this yields (A Þ C) Ç (B Þ C) Í (A È B) Þ C. 
(ii) (Borceux 1994, Proposition 1.2.3). Thus, all A are inf-semi-maps.¨ 
 
Below we present two dual formulas: 
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(5.4)(iii) jA Ç B(C) = jA(C) È jB(C).   
(5.4)(iv)           jA (B È C) = jA(B) È jA(C). 
It is easy to see that these formulas are not valid for general Heyting algebras OX. 
 
(5.5) Example. For the space (R, OR), formulas (5.4)(iii) and (5.4)(iv) do not hold. To disprove 
(5.4)(iii), consider C = Ø. Then, (5.4)(iii) yields the second de Morgan law (A Ç B)* = (A* È 
B*). This is well known to not hold for the Heyting algebra (R, OR). For instance, take A = (-
∞, 0) and B = (0, ∞). Then, one has (A Ç B)* = R and (A* È B*) = R - {0}. For disproving 
(iv), consider the open intervals A = (1/2, 3/2), B = (0, 1), and C = (1, 2) of R. Then, one 
calculates: 
                       1Î ((1/2, 3/2) Þ (0, 2)) but 1 Ï ((1/2, 3/2) Þ (0,1) È (1, 2)).¨ 
Furthermore, Niefield and Rosenthal proved that (5.4)(i) and (5.4)(ii) are equivalent (cf. 
Niefield and Rosenthal (1981, Proposition (2.15))). Thus, it is natural to ask whether there is a 
class of topological spaces (X, OX) whose Heyting algebras OX satisfy not only (5.4)(i) and 
(5.4)(ii) but also (5.4)(iii) and (5.4)(iv). This is indeed the case.4 Recall the following 
topological definitions. 
 
(5.6) Definition. (i) A topological space (X, OX) is extremally disconnected if and only if the 
interior of every closed set is closed or, equivalently, if disjoint open sets always possess 
disjoint closure, i.e., intclint(A) = cl(int(A)) for all A Í X. 
(ii) An extremally disconnected space is a hereditarily extremally disconnected space (HED 
space) iff every subspace of (X, OX) is extremally disconnected.¨ 
 
 
4 More precisely, this leads to the class of hereditarily extremally disconnected (HED) spaces. This class is 
discussed in some detail in Baltag et al. (2019). 
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(5.7) Example. Let (N, ON) be the set of natural numbers endowed with the cofinite topology. 
Then, (N, ON) is a hereditarily extremally disconnected space. Another HED space is given 
by endowing the linear order (N, ≤) with the order topology, i.e., the open sets Ø, N, and {m; 
m ≥ n for some n Î N}. More generally, countable extremally disconnected spaces are well 
known to be HED spaces. HED spaces (X, OX) can be fully characterized by the lattice-
theoretical properties of their Heyting algebras OX (see Gutierrez et al. (2020), Bezhanishvili 
et al. (2015)). 
 
(5.8) Theorem. A topological space (X, OX) is an HED space iff its Heyting algebra OX 
satisfies the following (equivalent) conditions: 
 
(1)  (A ÞB) Ú (B Þ A) = 1. 
(2)  A Þ (B Ú C) = (A Þ B) Ú (A Þ C). 
(3)  (B Ù C) Þ A = (B Þ A) Ú (C Þ A).¨ 
For A, B Î DOX, one obtains for the corresponding dense belief operators jA and jB.  
 
(5.9) Corollary. Let (X, OX) be a HED space, where A, B, C Î OX. Let OX —jZ—>NUC(OX) 
be defined by jZ(C):= Z Þ C. Then, jZ satisfies the following equations: 
(i)   jA È B(C) = jA(C) Ç jB(C).            
 
(ii)   jA Ç B(C) = jA(C) È jB(C). 
 
Equation (i) holds for all topological spaces (X, OX), and (ii) holds only for HED spaces. These 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS. The main result of this paper is that the same concept of 
knowledge is compatible with several different belief operators, which are defined by different 
dense nuclei j Î NUC(OX).5 Therefore, for a given knowledge operator K, a wealth of 
“admissible” or “fitting” belief operators B can be defined such that all pairs (K, B) satisfy the 
axioms and rules of Stalnaker’s KB system6. This plurality may be interpreted as a formal 
argument for doxastic tolerance: two epistemic agents t1 and t2 may rely on the same 
knowledge operator K but subscribe to different nuclear belief operators B1 and B2 that are 
compatible with K in the sense that both (K, B1) and (K, B2) satisfy Stalnaker’s axioms. By 
subscribing to the strong axiom of negative introspection (NI), the possibility of a pluralism of 
different coexisting belief operators compatible with a given knowledge operator is excluded 
in favor of one “dogmatic” system that allows only one acceptable belief operator. 
Due to Isbell’s density theorem, the class of dense nuclei has a maximal element j**. Beyond 
j**, the belief operators B = jint are necessarily inconsistent, i.e., B(Ø) ≠ Ø.7 Using the 
terminology of Baltag et al. (2019), we may say that consistent nuclear belief operators B live 
in the interval K < B ≤ <K>K. 
Finally, we share a remark on open operators. The difference between belief operators B = jAint 
based on dense open sets A Î DOX and operators B = jint for which j fails to be open like j** 
has an interesting epistemological interpretation, which comes to the foreground most clearly 
when we interpret the knowledge operator int slightly differently than before, namely, not as 
“known” but as “knowable” (cf. Bjorndahl and Özgün (2020). As is easily observed, 
Stalnaker’s axioms for a KB system remain plausible in this interpretation. More precisely, 
assume that D Í X and w Î int(D). Then, a cognitive agent t, who uses the knowledge operator 
 
5 Some of these nuclei may be defined by subsets A Î DOX (or other dense subsets of X), while others such as 
j** cannot be obtained in this way. 
6 With the exception of (NI). 
7 This does not mean that such operators are uninteresting but rather that investigating them requires conceptual 
devices that have not been developed in this paper. 
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int and the belief operator B:= jAint, can be described as someone who believes that w is a D-
world iff w Î B(D) and can even know that w is a D-world iff w Î int(D). If w is not an element 
of the topologically small (nowhere dense) set CA, then t’s belief that w ÎB(D) is true and 
even knowable for all D. In contrast, if t uses a belief operator B that is based on a non-open 
nucleus, his belief may be less reliable. Depending on the topological structure of the 
underlying topological space (X, OX) and the specific structure of D, it may often be the case 
that w Î B(D) but actually w Ï D, i.e., t’s belief is wrong. This is shown by the following 
example: 
 
(6.1) Example.   Let (X, OX) be the open unit interval (0, 1) endowed with the topology OX 
generated by the Euclidean topology and the set of rational numbers Q between 0 and 1 as 
open. Choose D = Q. Then for B = j**int one obtains B(Q) = R, i.e., t believes that w is a D-
world for all worlds w. Clearly, t’s belief is false for most worlds (in a quite precise sense of 
cardinality.¨ 
 
Belief operators BA based on dense open sets A, i.e., B(D):= jA(D) = A Þ int(D), may be 
characterized as “knowable” since A, as elements of OX, can be known by the cognitive agent 
t who relies on K. In contrast, the existence of non-open dense belief operators shows that the 
basis of belief may be unknowable in principle to cognitive agents who subscribe to belief 
operators compatible with the knowledge operator they rely on. In summary, if one’s belief 
operator B is based on a dense open set A ÎOX, the resulting system of knowledge and belief 
may be characterized as one for which operators K and B are related in a much more elementary 
way than they would be otherwise. This corresponds to the fact that open nuclei are simply the 
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